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Abstract 
This paper looks back at 20 years of inflation targeting (IT) in the world, reviewing 
previous findings and reporting new cross-country and panel-data evidence on the 
determinants or IT regime choice and the results of IT adoption. After describing the where 
and when of IT adoption, the paper assesses the determinants of why countries choose this 
monetary regime against alternative candidates. Which have been the main results under 
IT? Next the paper focuses on several dimensions of monetary policy performance under 
IT. One is target achievement; beyond measuring cross-country differences in target 
deviations, the paper assesses empirically what lies behind those deviations. Two, it 
reviews monetary policy efficiency more broadly, comparing output and inflation volatility 
under IT to volatility observed in non-IT experiences. Three, it surveys descriptive 
evidence on monetary policy transparency attained under IT in comparison to other 
monetary regimes. A discussion of the very important challenges posed by the recent 
boom-and-bust cycle to IT close the paper. 
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Carl Walsh (2009a): 
“The ability to deal with demand shocks and financial crises can be enhanced by a 
commitment to an explicit (inflation) target” 
 
Joseph Stiglitz (2008): 
“Today, inflation targeting is been put to the test – and it will almost certainly fail” 
 
Introduction 
  Two decades  have passed since the Reserve Bank of New Zealand pioneered 
modern monetary policy practice by adopting inflation targeting (IT). Since then, IT has 
gained followers and reputation, becoming the monetary regime of choice among many 
central bankers and academics. This preference has been revealed by the fact that no central 
bank endowed with monetary sovereignty that has adopted IT since 1989 has abandoned IT 
– until now, at least.
1
  Widespread adoption of IT as the frontier monetary regime around the world poses 
some questions about the economic and institutional factors that lead countries to adopt and 
sustain IT, and about the potential policy and performance benefits of IT. On what drives 
countries to implement IT, earlier studies point toward the role of initial institutional and 
economic conditions satisfied when adopting and maintaining IT adoption (e.g., Mishkin 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007).  In contrast, Batini and Laxon (2007) show that initial 
conditions do not matter for adopting IT – most countries build up gradually, after starting 
IT, better macroeconomic conditions and institutional features of full-fledged IT. 
 While at the time of this writing, in the midst of the worst financial 
crisis and global recession in a lifetime, it seems a bit  adventurous to provide a firm 
forecast on IT’s future prospects, my bet is that Walsh will be proven right in its quote and 
Stiglitz wrong. 
                                                           
1 Three European countries (Finland, Spain, and the Slovak Republic) that had adopted IT in the past have 
relinquished monetary sovereignty subsequently by adopting the euro and hence abandoning IT. They will be 
followed my more currently IT and non-IT European countries in the future.   3 
 
The literature on the benefits  of  IT  is older and deeper, spanning a decade of 
empirical research on its potential effects on inflation levels, output and inflation stability, 
inflation expectations, exchange-rate to inflation pass-through, monetary policy efficiency, 
and anchoring of inflation expectations, among other policy performance indicators. Such 
research includes, inter alia, country and cross-country empirical work reported by Corbo 
et al. (2002); Mishkin and Savastano, 2000; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Schmidt-
Hebbel and Werner, 2002; Carare and Stone, 2003; Vega and Winkelried, 2005; Mishkin 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Gürkaynak et al., 2007; De Carvalho and Minella, 2009; and 
other contributions published in the volumes edited by Bernanke et. al., 1999; Bernanke 
and Woodford (2005); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008); and Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Walsh  (2009).  An outlier is  the finding by Ball and Sheridan (2005) that IT does not 
improve macroeconomic performance in industrial countries, compared to other industrial 
countries that do not target inflation, at least explicitly. 
  IT also enhances  the transparency of monetary policy, largely because it relies 
heavily on inflation forecasts (hence Svensson (1997)’s labeling of IT as “inflation-forecast 
targeting) and private-sector inflation expectations. This feature enhances the efforts of IT 
central banks in strengthening their forms of communication with the markets and the 
general public, upgrading and reinforcing their transparency and governance (Eijffinger and 
Geraats, 2006, and Geraats, 2008). 
Yet against IT’s  generally remarkable record, the world economy’s 2002-2010 
boom-bust  cycle, triggered and deepened by a massive financial crisis  in industrial 
economies, has put into question the analytical foundation, forecasting, and policy making 
of modern monetary policy making – with or without explicit IT. For example, Buiter’s 
(2009)  scathing indictment of modern macroeconomics,  finance,  and monetary policy 
started a timely debate on the limitations and failures of the analytical foundations and 
policy practice in the latter fields, finding in Lucas (2009) a strong defender of the “dismal 
science”. This debate and its implications for theory and policy are just starting, and will 
also certainly affect our future understanding of best monetary policy practice in general 
and under IT in particular. 4 
 
This paper is laid out as follows. I start in section 1 by describing the where and 
when of IT adoption, focusing on the world sample of currently 28 countries that have IT in 
place. Next I focus on the why of IT adoption, by assessing  empirically the main 
determinants that lead central banks to choose this monetary regime. In section 3 I review 
the  cross-country  performance of IT central banks in attaining their targets, assessing 
empirically the role of institutional factors that drive those results.  Then I present and 
survey evidence on the role of IT in three areas of monetary policy performance: inflation 
levels, policy efficiency, and policy transparency. In section 5 I discuss some questions 
posed to the conduct of monetary policy at large – and under IT in particular – by the still 
ongoing boom-bust cycle cum financial crisis. Brief conclusions close the paper. 
1. Where and when? The spreading of IT 
  The number of IT countries has increased from 1 in 1989-1990 (New Zealand, the 
“mother of all ITers”) to 28 in late 2008 (Fig. 1).
2 Among industrial countries, IT is not 
particularly popular – only 8 of them have joined the IT club to date, the last two ones in 
1999. One reason for this is the continuous erosion of monetary sovereignty in Europe as a 
result of the gradual growth of the Euro Area. The second is that the Big Three – the Fed, 
the ECB, and the Bank of Japan – have not adopted IT, at least not of the explicit sort 
favored by the 28 countries included in this paper.
3
  Among developing and emerging-market economies (denoted EMEs subsequently), 
IT spread early and quickly, starting with Chile in 1991 and growing to 20 countries spread 
over four continents in late 2008. Many EMEs adopted initially partial IT, shifting only 
later, and often quite gradually, to full-fledged IT, with all the bells and whistles of frontier-
practice  IT,  including a floating exchange-rate regime and  high levels of policy 
transparency. Moreover, many EME ITers used IT initially as a price stabilization device, 
 
                                                           
2 Hammond (2009) presents a detailed overview of the key features of IT in 26 IT central banks and a 
discussion of the main issues faced by IT today. 
3 It is debatable if Switzerland should be counted as an IT country. The Swiss National Bank does not define 
its monetary policy framework as that of an explicit inflation targeter. Yet I have decided to include 
Switzerland in my world count of ITers due to the close similarity of its monetary policy regime to those of 
other ITers.  5 
 
adopting  the new regime at initially moderate  and even high inflation levels and pre-
announcing a sequence of annually declining inflation targets – what is termed converging-
target IT.  As of late 2008 there are 10  EME ITers that  have graduated from target 
convergence by attaining low-inflation stationary inflation targets, 10 other EMEs are still 
converging toward stationary targets (Table 1). 
  Adoption dates and inflation rates during the 12 months before adoption show the 
contrasting experience of IE ITers (with low initial inflation rates; Fig. 2) and many EME 
ITers (with moderate to high initial inflation rates; Fig. 3). 
2. Why? The determinants of adopting IT and holding on to it 
  Central banks devote time to evaluate if their country’s macroeconomic conditions 
and their own institutional setup and policy framework are ripe for IT adoption, i.e., if they 
meet so-called pre-conditions for successful IT adoption and maintaining. Standard initial 
conditions identified by the earlier literature include central bank operational independence, 
absence of fiscal and financial dominance, and moderately low inflation (e.g., Mishkin and 
Savastano 2000, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007). In contrast, Batini and Laxton (2008) 
show that the absence of some of the latter prerequisites at the time of adoption does not 
inhibit the start of IT. 
Next I report selective results work by Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008a) on 
empirical  determinants  of  the likelihood of  choosing  and having in place IT  among 
alternative monetary regimes. The panel-data specification is the following:   
(1)     0) u β ' (x y t i, i t i, t i, ≥ + + = e 1  
where y is a discrete-choice variable that is set equal to 1 if the argument (the IT choice) is 
positive and 0 otherwise. The set of possible determinants are grouped in matrix x. The 
country-specific effect is u, e is a zero-mean disturbance term, and i and t are country and 
time subscripts, respectively. 6 
 
  Equation (1) is estimated by using discrete-choice panel estimation techniques 
applied to annual data covering 1975-2005 for  98 IT and non-IT countries.
4  Selective 
results are reported in Table 2. Inflation affects negatively the likelihood of adopting IT. 
The fiscal position (measured by the government  balance ratio to GDP) and  domestic 
financial development (proxied by the private credit ratio to GDP) raise the probability of 
having IT in place. The two latter variables suggest that a country is more likely to adopt IT 
in the absence of fiscal and financial dominance, which conforms to the earlier literature on 
IT preconditions. Also consistent with previous policy views, we report results that IT is 
more likely in countries with a floating exchange-rate regime in place.
5
Unfortunately the latter estimation approach drops the country-specific effects and 
therefore preclude proper computation of the marginal effects of individual determinants on 
the likelihood of having IT in place. Leyva (2008) overcomes this limitation by estimating 
jointly the individual (country-specific) effects and the slope parameters, at the cost of 
restricting the country sample to 25 ITers, spanning 1989-2005, i.e., including several years 
before IT adoption for each included country.
 GDP per capita – a 
proxy of overall institutional development, including, for example, central bank 
independence – is also a significant determinant. Trade openness, which stands as a proxy 
for the influence of best monetary policy practice abroad, also contributes to having IT in 
place. Most latter variables, as reflected in alternative specifications, are significant and 
robust determinants of the choice of IT. 
6
                                                           
4 Both fixed and random-effects models are estimated. The fixed-effects approach drops the country-specific 
effects for assuring consistency in the estimation of slope parameters (in contrast to the individual effects). 
The random-effects model typically assumes a joint normal distribution between individual effects and the 
rest of the inflation determinants. The drawback of the former approach is that the estimator is restricted to 
those individuals whose regime choice changes over time ( the so-called movers), while the second is not. 
This explains the difference in sample size between fixed-effects and random-effects results reported in Table 
2.   
 The estimation results by Leyva (2008), 
based on a similar specification, are also similar to those reported in Table 2. His estimated 
marginal effects for the main IT choice determinants are reproduced in Table 3. The largest 
5 The exchange-rate regime is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for fixed and 
intermediate exchange-rate regimes. 
6 Although the number of countries is severely restricted, he shows that the bias in the estimation of slope 
parameters is reasonably small. 7 
 
marginal effects stem from changes in overall development: raising income levels from, 
say, Indonesia’s to Poland’s, raises the likelihood of having IT in place by a massive 66%. 
Significant improvements in the three other determinants – lower inflation, higher financial 
development, larger trade openness – have smaller effects on the choice of IT. 
3. Inflation Deviations from Targets 
  Monetary policy success hinges on consistent central bank behavior and strong 
private-sector credibility. ITers have been aiming at the latter by committing to explicit 
inflation targets. Have they succeeded in meeting their targets? And what explains their 
success? I answer these questions in two steps. First, I measure inflation deviations from 
targets using three alternative measures and I estimate half-lives of inflation shocks, for 
each and every IT country experience and several country groups.  Second, I report 
empirical estimations of the role played by institutional and macroeconomic performance 
measures in explaining the panel-data variation in inflation deviations from targets, based 
on Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). 
  For measuring inflation deviations from targets I use (at most) 1990-2008 quarterly 
data of year-on-year consumer inflation for the world population or 28 ITers and official 
data on the corresponding inflation targets announced  since the countries’  IT starting 
dates.
7
Three alternative inflation deviation measures are reported for each country since its 
corresponding  IT  starting date in Table 5: the mean absolute error (MAE), the mean 
squared error (MSE), and the root mean squared error (RMSE). Countries are ordered from 
smallest (Switzerland) to largest (Ghana) MSE or RMSE. The country ranking by MAE is 
slightly different from the rankings based on any of the two alternative measures but the 
value or rank correlation between MAE and any of the two alternatives is very high. 
 
                                                           
7 Quarterly inflation rates are taken from the IFS (IMF) database. I use annual inflation targets publicly 
reported in central bank web pages. For converging ITers that announce annual calendar-year inflation 
targets, I calculate quarterly targets by linear interpolation, assuming that the fourth-quarter inflation target is 
the annual target announced for the corresponding year. 8 
 
Interestingly, persistence of inflation shocks –  measured by the half-life  of monthly 
inflation deviations from targets
8
Figures 4-7 depict quarterly inflation deviations measured as MAE for each country 
over time, reported separately by regional country groups. Figures 8 and 9 report RMSEs 
for each country by four main country groups. The average RMSE for EMEs is equal to 3 
percentage points (p.p.), more than twice the IC’s average RMSE of 1.4 p.p. (Fig. 8). The 
average RMSE of stationary ITers is 2 p.p., close to half of the converging ITers’ RMSE of 
3.8 p.p. 
 – is largely orthogonal to the size of inflation deviations 
across countries, as shown by the second column of Table 4. Half-lives of inflation 
deviations range from lows of 6 to 8 months (Armenia, Mexico, Turkey, Norway; although 
some of these include very few observations) to highs of 27-29 months (United Kingdom, 
Philippines).  
  In order to describe how inflation deviations have changed over time, I compute 
rolling estimations of RMSEs, using a window size of 8 quarters (Figure 10). Before 2007 
both industrial and emerging economies exhibit downward RMSE trends, during the period 
that has been labelled as the “Great Moderation” (IMF 2006, Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel 
2008b). This came to an abrupt end during the late phase of the boom, as unprecedented 
commodity price inflation was passed through consumer prices all over the world – 
especially in EMEs and even more so in converging-target EMEs.  Yet for the full 1992-
2008 period, this figure confirms that RMSEs are consistently larger in EMEs than in IEs, 
and so they are in converging as compared to stationary ITers. 
  Next I focus on potential  determinants  of  inflation target  deviations.  I follow 
Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) in specifying the deviation of inflation from target as a 
function of institutional development, controlling for oil and exchange-rate shocks: 
(1)     t i, i t i, 3 t i, 2 t i, 1 t i, e u IICR β ) abs(NER β ) abs(OIL β AD + + + + =  
                                                           
8 Half-lives are computed from a simple AR(1) process for each country’s monthly inflation deviation from 
target, by calculating the impulse response for a unitary (1- percentage- point) shock. 9 
 
where AD is the absolute value of inflation deviation, abs() denotes absolute value, OIL is 
the HP-filtered oil price, NER is the nominal exchange rate depreciation, and IICR is the 
Institutional Investor’s Credit Rating index. The country-specific effect is u, e is a zero-
mean disturbance term, and i and t are country and time subscripts, respectively.  
The main hypothesis is that IICR (and a separate measure of central bank 
independence, CBI) contribute to stronger monetary policy credibility and better-anchored 
inflation expectations, reducing the size of inflation deviations from targets. Table 5 reports 
unbalanced panel-data evidence from a world sample of 19 IT countries, based on annual 
data spanning at most 1990-2003. Controlling for the influence of oil and exchange-rate 
shocks, IICR is shown as a significant and robust factor in lowering inflation deviations. 
CBI may also help in reducing inflation deviations from targets but its influence is less 
robust to changes in specification. 
4. Which other Results? 
  In this section I report other performance results of IT, also drawing from cross-
country and panel-data evidence. I focus on three performance measures: long-term 
inflation levels, monetary policy efficiency, and central bank transparency. 
  Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) assess empirically the effects of IT on long-
term inflation, taking as starting point previous cross-section studies on differences in long-
term inflation between ITers and non-ITers. Table 6 summarizes the results of previous 
studies, adding new estimates by the authors, which show that long-term inflation levels are 
higher in IT countries than in a stringent control group of high-performing non-IT industrial 
countries. The diversity of the cross-section results reported in Table 6, all based on similar 
specifications, illustrates the fact that empirical findings results are highly sensitive to the 
choice of treatment and control groups. In addition, the latter results are based on weak 
estimation techniques (inflation could is not instrumentalized) and the lack of the time 
dimension. Therefore Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) specify a dynamic equation for 
the difference in long-term inflation levels in IT and non-IT countries and estimate it using 
an instrumental-variable panel-data model for a large panel sample. Table 7 summarizes a 10 
 
wide range of long-term inflation differences between alternative treatment and control 
groups. Reported differences in results confirming that the choice of treatment and control 
groups is key for the corresponding results. However, it is interesting to note that long-term 
inflation is 1.1% lower in the subset of IE ITers than in the control group of IE non-ITers, 
in opposition to the cross-country result by Ball and Sheridan (2005), who report no 
differences betweeen IE ITers and non-ITers. 
  Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008b) find that adopting IT and having it in place 
lowers inflation rates. They assess the role of non-monetary factors in determining inflation 
in a world panel based on the following specification: 
(2)   t i CYC STIN PN ERR NFR , e u O β M β I β i 3 2 1 t i, + + + + + + + = 5 4 0 β β β π  
where π is the normalized inflation rate
9
  The panel-data estimation results for equation (2), reported in table 8, are based on a 
world sample of annual data covering 1975-2005 and comprising 65 countries, including 
both ITers and non-ITers. The main result for this paper is that having an IT regime in place 
lowers annual inflation by roughly 5 p.p. Note that here the control group is comprised by 
all non-IT countries in the world included in this study, among them many non-IT EMEs 
with at least moderate inflation rates. 
, INFR stands for inflation-related variables (high 
inflation and hyperinflation dummy variables; lagged inflation), MERR is a set of dummy 
variables for monetary and exchange rate regimes, OPN  comprises openness variables 
(measures of trade and financial openness; external inflation), STIN is a set of structural and 
institutional variables (democratic accountability, per capita GDP, the fiscal surplus ratio to 
GDP,  and the private credit ratio to GDP), and CYC  denotes  cyclical  variables  (the 
domestic and foreign output gaps; the cyclical component of international oil prices). 
This result is robust to using different samples, estimating techniques, and 
specifications that control for a  sizeable number of statistically significant inflation 
                                                           
9 INF is defined as: (annual inflation) / (1 + annual inflation). 11 
 
determinants,  as reported in Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008b). Other than the IT 
regime, significant and robust variables that reduce inflation in the world are financial 
openness, the fiscal balance, income per capita, the output gap, and a fixed exchange-rate 
regime. 
  Next I turn to the issue of monetary policy efficiency. Focusing only on inflation 
volatility – or inflation deviations from targets, as in section 3 above – is a partial and hence 
potentially biased way to assess efficiency of monetary policy. The usual, more 
comprehensive approach involves measures of both inflation and output variability. 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), following Cecchetti et al. (2006),  solve for the 
minimization problem of a central-bank loss function based on inflation and output 
volatility, subject to a highly stylized structure of an economy reflected by aggregate 
demand and supply equations. Extending the previous empirical work by Cecchetti et al. 
applied to individual countries, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel estimate the system of 
equations on panel data for different treatment (IT) country groups and different control 
(non-IT) country groups,  based on quarterly data for 1989-2004.  Using the parameter 
estimates and the model solution, they construct inflation-output variability frontiers that 
represent measures of economic performance and monetary policy efficiency. Supply shock 
variability is interpreted as a change in the position of the efficiency frontier while the 
efficiency of monetary policy is measured by the distance from the economy’s observed 
volatility performance to the policy efficiency frontier. 
Figure 11 depicts two efficiency frontiers and two observed points of output and 
inflation variability: one for inflation targeters before they adopted IT and for stationary 
ITers after they converged to stationary targets. The more outward efficiency frontier and 
observed volatility performance represents a control group of subsequent IT countries from 
1986 and extending to the quarter before they adopt IT. The more inward efficiency frontier 
and observed volatility performance represents a treatment group of  stationary-target ITers 
that extends from the first quarter of stationary targets through the last quarter of 2004. 
Figure 12 plots efficiency frontiers and observed volatility points for the treatment group of 
stationary ITers (again) and for the control group of non-IT economies. The main finding 12 
 
represented in the two latter figures is that IT has helped to improve massively the 
efficiency of monetary policy of ITers but monetary policy efficiency still falls short of 
efficiency levels observed in the stringent control group of high-performing non-IT 
industrial countries. 
  Finally I refer briefly to the contribution of IT in attaining higher levels of central 
bank transparency, based on simple unconditional analysis derived from the data collected 
by other researchers. Policy transparency is a key issue for IT central banks as they aim at 
policy credibility in general and anchoring inflation expectations in particular. Eijffinger 
and  Geraats (2006)  develop an aggregate central bank transparency index based on 
performance indicators grouped into five measures: political transparency (related to policy 
objectives), economic transparency (related to information disclosure on data, models and 
forecasts),  procedural transparency  (which  refers to  the release of minutes and votes), 
policy transparency(related to the announcement and explanation of policy decisions), and 
operational transparency (regarding implementation of policy decisions). They apply the 
latter transparency measures to several industrial countries. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) 
extend the latter database by including more countries and separating between ICs and 
EMEs. 
  Figure 13, borrowed from Geraats (2008), plots average transparency indexes for 
different country groups classified by four alternative monetary policy regimes over the 
period  1998-2006.  ITers achieve by far the highest levels of aggregate central bank 
transparency among all countries pursuing different monetary regimes. Moreover, ITers 
have been able to raise over time the distance in transparency from countries under other 
regimes. Figure 14 reflects the transparency improved attained by IC and EME ITers during 
1998-2005. While transparency in IC ITers is much larger than in EME ITers, the gap is 
narrowing over time. 
5. What lies ahead for IT regimes? 
  I will refer to two sets of challenges that lie ahead for IT central banks. The first 
relates to demands for enlarging monetary policy transparency. The second set is comprised 13 
 
by systemic challenges to the conduct of policy and the design of IT stems derived from 
questions posed by the monetary policy experience of the 2002-2009 boom-bust cycle (for 
more detailed discussions see Walsh 2009a, b and Hammond 2009). 
The evidence discussed in this and other papers on the comparative achievements of 
monetary policy under IT suggests that explicit IT dominates other successful monetary 
regimes (including implicit IT and other monetary regimes different from explicit IT, like 
those pursued by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of 
Japan)  in  several  dimensions. First, IT enhances transparency and accountability  more 
effectively as other regimes, as shown in the evidence reported by Dincer and Eichengreen 
(2007) and Geraats (2008). IT also provides more predictability because of less discretion 
in monetary policy decisions (Walsh, 2009 a,b). Third, IT guarantees better anchoring of 
inflation expectations (Gürkaynak et al., 2007 and De Carvalho and Minella, 2009). 
Finally, IT does not imply higher output volatility than other monetary regimes, as shown 
by Schmidt-Hebbel and Mishkin (2008), among others (as discussed by Walsh 2009a).   
But  many  inflation-targeting  central  banks  still  face  important  transparency and 
communication challenges. First, following the advice of academics and the encouraging of 
several IT central banks to date, all ITers should aim at publish their interest-rate forecasts 
and fan charts, complementing publication of inflation and output growth forecasts and fan 
charts. Second, to make a clearer, more transparent connection between monetary policy 
decisions and published projections of central banks, they should include their backcasts 
and forecasts of key unobservable variables, including potential or efficient-level output 
(and the  output gap),  the  natural unemployment rate  (and  the natural rate of 
unemployment), the neutral rate of interest (and the interest-rate gap), and the equilibrium 
exchange rate (and the deviation of the actual from the equilibrium exchange rate). Finally, 
while  central banks have made improvements in procedural transparency, they should 
commit to publish timely and full transcripts (minutes) of their monetary policy meetings. 
Frontier monetary policy – under both IT and other inflation regimes – is severely 
challenged by our current understanding of the current financial crisis cum recession and 14 
 
the boom-and-bubble period that preceded it. This raises two sets of issues for monetary 
policy and monetary regime choice: the role of asset prices and financial frictions for 
monetary policy in general (not just under IT) and the design of IT. 
The pre-crisis consensus view on the role of asset prices and monetary policy was 
that the latter should react to asset-price shocks only to the extent that they affect inflation 
forecasts or if the real interest rate were affected by financial shocks (Bernanke and Gertler 
2001). Yet financial frictions (like real frictions) affect monetary policy transmission and 
interact with nominal rigidities, hence calling for monetary policy to mitigate the effects of 
the latter interaction.
10
A separate, much longer discussion has been whether central banks should lean 
against the wind of asset-price bubbles. Cecchetti et al. (2000), Cecchetti el al. (2002), and 
Borio and White (2003) have argued that monetary policy should attempt burst bubbles ex 
ante. Against the latter, the wide-shared consensus view was that monetary policy was too 
ineffective to deal with bubbles, that bubbles were difficult to identify ex ante, and that the 
more effective alternative would be to address the effects of a busting bubble by easing 
policy after the fact (Bernanke and Gertler 2001, Bernanke 2002, Gertler 2003). The latter 
consensus view has been seriously shattered by the massive real costs and deflationary 
consequences of the housing and equity  price bursts observed in many industrial 
economies, with world-wide consequences. While this bubble-and-bust experience has also 
certainly other causes in many market and regulatory imperfections that require separate 
 The crisis has highlighted the latter role for monetary policy (as 
shown in recent theoretical work by Cúrdia and Woodford 2008, De Fiore and Tristani 
2009, and Demirel 2009)  although, as pointed out by Walsh (2009b), the appropriate 
monetary policy response will depend on the type of financial friction and shock. 
                                                           
10 Walsh (2009a) makes the important point that this monetary policy acts as a second-best policy. If an 
effective time-varying fiscal-policy instrument (based on taxes and subsidies) were available to counteract the 
effects of mark-up (real) shocks, monetary policy would not be necessary to mitigate the inflation and output 
effects of interactions between real frictions and nominal rigidities. In the same vein, if an effective time-
varying financial regulation (for example, counter-cyclical capital and liquidity requirements) were available 
to counteract of financial shocks, like changes in credit spreads, monetary would be not necessary to mitigate 
the consequences of interactions between financial frictions and nominal rigidities.   15 
 
regulatory reform, it is likely to lead to changes in the conduct of monetary policy – both 
with and without IT – aiming at deflating incipient asset-price bubbles. 
Another issue brought to the forefront by monetary policy actions during the current 
crisis is to come to a better theoretical and practical understanding of how conventional 
monetary policy  –  both under IT and other monetary regimes –  is  complemented by 
unconventional monetary (and credit) policy, as reflected by the massive deployment of 
quantitative (and credit) easing to provide liquidity to illiquid financial markets and firms. 
Finally, the crisis has brought to the open the problems faced by monetary policy 
under conditions of severe deflationary demand shock that leads to policy rate cuts toward 
zero, i.e., when the zero-lower bound (ZLB) is binding.
11
The most radical challenge to IT comes from the proposal of adopting price level 
targeting (PLT). Long before the current crisis, Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2006) were 
among the first to evaluate seriously the relative merits and possible adoption of PLT. The 
latter’s  main theoretical advantage over IT is that the expectation that prices will return to 
their target level influences current inflation when price setting is forward-looking. This 
benefit is particularly strong when the ZLB holds and the economy is in a deflationary 
 Three design corrections to the 
actual implementation of OT in most countries could reduce the likelihood of attaining the 
ZLB: raising the numerical inflation target (at the cost of having higher average inflation) 
and adopting a core-inflation target, which exhibits less volatility around the central target 
value than headline inflation (at the cost of reducing the usefulness and credibility of a 
headline-inflation target). A final challenge for IT design is to assess the possible extension 
of standard policy horizons under IT (typically between 2 and 3 years) to 5 years or more, 
as suggested recently by Mishkin (2008). The three latter alternatives have been discussed 
in the literature on the start and optimal design of IT. They were largely dismissed until 
now but the binding ZLB and the protracted recession make their discussion relevant again. 
                                                           
11 A radical alternative would be to lift the ZLB restriction by adopting negative policy rates. While the 
Sverige Rijksbank has done so by adopting a -0.25% policy rate in August 2009, it remains to be seen if such 
a policy can overcome operational limitations derived from  the ensuing dominance of money over negative 
interest-bearing assets. 16 
 
liquidity trap. Deflation bygones under IT are not bygones under PLT, requiring future 
inflation that is on average higher that the inflation target level (or the price level target 
trend). As this is anticipated by forward-looking agents, the likelihood of getting into a 
deflationary situation is lower under PLT  and, when it materializes, the likelihood of 
getting out more quickly is larger under PLT.
12
6. Concluding remarks 
 Hence PLT is likely to emerge as a viable 
and possibly superior alternative to – or improvement of – IT in the future. 
  IT has come a long way since its birth two decades ago. The evidence shows that IT 
is not observationally equivalent to other monetary regimes used by frontier central banks 
(like implicit IT) or to best-practice monetary policy—neither in design nor in performance. 
Moreover,  IT dominates alternative monetary regimes (including implicit IT and non-
explicit regimes) in several dimensions. Yet the current crisis and the preceding boom-and-
bubble period pose serious challenges to IT as we know it – and to the frontier conduct of 
monetary policy generally, under IT or other monetary regimes. 
  Many more emerging economies are likely to adopt a variant of IT in the future. It is 
also possible that some current ITers in Europe will drop out of the club as they join the 
Euro area. Yet the specific form that frontier best-practice IT in a broad sense – including 
price-level targeting – will take in the next (third) decade of its existence is far from clear 
now, the same way the current frontier IT regime was not anticipated at the birth of IT two 
decades ago. 
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Table 1: Inflation Targeting Countries in the World, 1990-2008 
              
Country  Date of Adoption  Inflation Target at 
the End of 2008 (%) 
Definition of an Inflation 





              
         
Armenia  2006  4.00  E  C 
Australia  1993  2.50  I  S 
Brazil  1999  4.50  E  C 
Canada  1991  2.00  I  S 
Chile  1991  3.00  E  S 
Colombia  2000  4.00  E  C 
Czech Republic  1998  3.00  E  S 
Ghana  2007  5.00  E  C 
Guatemala  2005  5.00  E  C 
Hungary  2001  3.00  E  C 
Iceland  2001  2.50  I  S 
Indonesia  2005  5.00  E  C 
Israel  1992  2.00  E  S 
Korea  1998  3.00  E  S 
Mexico  1995  3.00  E  S 
New Zealand  1990  2.00  I  S 
Norway  2001  2.50  I  S 
Peru  1994  2.00  E  S 
Philippines  2002  4.00  E  S 
Poland  1999  2.50  E  S 
Romania  2005  3.80  E  C 
Serbia  2007  4.50  E  C 
South Africa  2000  4.50  E  S 
Sweden  1993  2.00  I  S 
Switzerland  2000  1.00  I  S 
Thailand  2000  1.75  E  S 
Turkey  2006  4.00  E  C 
United Kingdom  1993  2.00  I  S 
              
         
 
Notes: 
     22 
 
Adoption dates are taken from Leyva (2008) 
     
Inflation targets are taken from central bank's web pages 
   
The middle point of the target is reported when the inflation target is defined as a range 
If the inflation targeting adoption date is July or later of any year t, the annual date reported is year t+1 
E=emerging, I=industrial, S=stationary, and C=converging 
     
Source:
 
 based on Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) and Leyva (2008). 
Table 2: Determinants of the Likelihood of having an IT Regime in place 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inflation -130.026 *** -117.311 *** -35.392 *** -36.295 *** -43.349 *** -36.421 *** -39.508 *** -33.487 ***
(2.95) (3.18) (5.10) (5.46) (6.13) (5.88) (6.63) (6.46)
Government budget balance -25.066 - 19.307 ** 20.685 ** 15.040 ** 17.909 ** - -
(1.45) - (2.07) (2.31) (1.98) (2.53) - -
Financial development 19.872 *** 16.881 *** 0.775 - 3.299 *** 3.186 *** 2.633 *** 2.677 ***
(3.07) (3.39) (0.55) - (3.19) (3.40) (2.99) (3.22)
Exchange rate regime -20.320 *** -17.824 *** -4.958 *** -5.068 *** -4.978 *** -4.464 *** -3.990 *** -3.655 ***
(3.03) (3.22) (5.27) (5.54) (7.04) (7.20) (7.74) (7.49)
GDP per capita 104.027 *** 90.130 *** 5.042 *** 5.249 *** 4.605 *** 3.478 *** 4.822 *** 3.829 ***
(3.19) (3.56) (4.78) (5.29) (5.08) (3.49) (5.90) (4.19)
Trade openness 46.763 *** 42.343 *** 1.156 - 2.289 ** 0.837 3.185 *** 2.134 **
(2.83) (3.03) (0.82) - (2.06) (0.68) (4.01) (2.53)
Money growth volatility - - -0.142 -0.126 - - - -
- - (0.44) (0.39) - - - -
Terms of trade volatility - - 1.760 0.959 - - - -
- - (0.28) (0.15) - - - -
Dummy LAC - - 6.986 *** 6.741 *** 7.789 *** - 7.433 *** -
- - (3.84) (4.11) (4.63) (4.85) -
Constant - - -45.403 *** -45.517 *** -43.798 *** -30.343 *** -47.961 *** -36.263 ***
- - (5.01) (5.27) (5.68) (3.44) (7.01) (4.57)
Observations 491 554 1143 1163 1854 1854 2305 2305
Number of countries 19 24 71 71 76 76 98 98
Countries with the IT regime 19 24 19 19 19 19 24 24
Countries without the IT regime 0 0 52 52 57 57 74 74
(control group)
LR statistic 450.19 499.19 76.03 75.10 126.91 126.90 177.77 161.95
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fixed effects Random effects
 
Source: Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). 23 
 
Table 3: Marginal Contribution of Key Determinants to IT Regime Likelihood  
           
Variable  Marginal contribution  Measure  Impact of… 
           
       
CPI inflation rate  13.19%   
a reduction of pi by 10 percentage points (p.p.) 
which amounts roughly a reduction of pi from 
17% to 5% 
Financial development  6.79%  ratio  an increase of the indicator by 10 p.p. 
GDP per capita  65.64%  in logs 
an increase of the log of GDP per capita by 1.2 
which accounts for passing from 2 (8.1 
Indonesia) to 3 (9.3 Poland) in income category 
Trade openness  8.82%  ratio  an increase of the indicator by 10 p.p. 
           
       
 
Notes: 
















Table 4: Measures of Inflation Deviations from Targets and Inflation Deviation  
in IT Countries, from IT Starting Quarter through 2008.IV  







months)  MAE  MSE  RMSE 
                      
 
                Switzerland 
 
36  11.6  0.4  0.3  0.5 
  United Kingdom 
 
69  27.1  0.9  1.1  1.1 
  Canada 
 
72  14.2  0.9  1.3  1.1 
  Sweden 
 
56  25.3  1.1  1.6  1.3 
  Norway 
 
32  8.0  1.1  2.0  1.4 
  New Zealand 
 
76  20.1  1.1  2.0  1.4 
  Australia 
 
64  20.0  1.1  2.1  1.4 
  Colombia 
 
37  15.7  1.2  2.8  1.7 
  Romania 
 
14  -  1.3  2.9  1.7 
  Korea 
 
44  18.9  1.1  3.1  1.8 
  Thailand 
 
36  23.2  1.2  3.1  1.8 
  Chile 
 
72  14.7  1.1  3.1  1.8 
  Philippines 
 
28  29.3  2.1  5.1  2.3 
  Czech Republic 
 
44  14.4  1.7  5.8  2.4 
  Poland 
 
42  24.4  2.0  6.1  2.5 
  Israel 
 
68  14.6  2.1  7.0  2.6 
  Guatemala 
 
16  14.5  2.2  7.1  2.7 
  Iceland 
 
32  16.6  2.2  8.1  2.8 
  Armenia 
 
12  6.8  2.5  8.2  2.9 
  Peru 
 
60  9.1  1.7  8.5  2.9 
  Hungary 
 
32  18.4  2.3  9.2  3.0 
  South Africa 
 
36  24.7  2.4  9.5  3.1 
  Serbia 
 
10  24.9  3.6  19.4  4.4 
  Brazil 
 
40  22.6  2.9  19.4  4.4 
  Mexico 
 
56  7.6  2.8  24.6  5.0 
  Turkey 
 
12  7.1  4.9  25.3  5.0 
  Indonesia 
 
16  10.3  3.9  30.4  5.5 
  Ghana 
 
8  -  6.2  40.1  6.3 
                      
 
               
 
Notes: 
            Sample comprises inflation targets and inflation rates from the start of IT in each country until the fourth quarter 25 
 
of 2008 
Half-life of an inflation deviation are defined as the number of periods that a given inflation deviation from target 
takes  
to converge to one-half its initial value 
          Half-lives are computed asumming that the best autoregressive process for inflation deviations for each country is 
an AR(1) 
MAE=Mean absolute error 
          MSE=Mean squared error 
          RMSE=Root mean squared error 
           
Source:
Table 5: Determinants of Inflation Deviations from Targets, Panel of 19 IT Countries, 
1990-2003 
 author’s calculation based on central bank and IMF data. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   AD1  AD2  AD3  AD1  AD2  AD3  AD1  AD2  AD3 
                    c  1.444  0.860  1.147  1.914  1.294  1.880  1.962  1.277  1.925 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
ABS(AD1(-1))  0.800  0.876  0.871  0.725  0.844  0.824  0.724  0.822  0.824 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ABS(AD1(-2))  -0.191  -0.246  -0.195  -0.190  -0.261  -0.186  -0.190  -0.225  -0.185 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ABS(AD1(-3))  -0.055 
 
-0.076  -0.087 
 




(0.037)  (0.016) 
 
(0.004)  (0.016)  (0.098)  (0.004) 
ABS(NER) 
 
0.009  0.009 
           
   
(0.022)  (0.031) 
            ABS(NER(-1))  0.015 
   
0.012  0.009  0.010  0.012  0.009  0.011 
 
(0.000) 
   
(0.007)  (0.039)  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.043)  (0.018) 
ABS(OILG)  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.006 
 
(0.020)  (0.013)  (0.035)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.025) 
ABS(OILG(-1))  -0.010  -0.010  -0.006  -0.010  -0.010  -0.006  -0.010  -0.010  -0.006 
 
(0.006)  (0.002)  (0.065)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.049)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.049) 
ABS(OILG(-2))  0.009  0.006  0.006  0.008  0.006  0.005  0.008  0.005  0.005 
 
(0.002)  (0.016)  (0.049)  (0.004)  (0.021)  (0.063)  (0.003)  (0.044)  (0.062) 
ABS(GAP(-3))  -0.040 
 
-0.033 
   
-0.025 






   
(0.108) 
   
(0.104) 
CBI  -0.161  -0.149  -0.144 
           
 
(0.010)  (0.007)  (0.015) 
           26 
 
IICR  -0.011  -0.007  -0.010  -0.020  -0.012  -0.020  -0.021  -0.011  -0.021 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.034)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.063)  (0.001) 
                    R2  0.51  0.58  0.59  0.53  0.61  0.62  0.53  0.58  0.62 
Adj. R2  0.50  0.57  0.58  0.50  0.59  0.60  0.50  0.55  0.60 
U-root test  -22.02  -21.56  -21.84  -22.26  -21.58  -21.46  -21.46  -22.09  -18.10 
N  517  536  517  517  536  517  517  517  517 
Intercept  C  C  C  F-effects  F-effects  F-effects  F-effects  F-effects  F-effects 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  TSLS  TSLS  TSLS 
 
 
Source: Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). 27 
 
Table 6: Estimates of Differences in Long-Term Inflation Rates between IT and 
Non-IT Countries in Four Cross-Section Studies 
           
Authors  Sample  Method 
Long-term Inflation-
level Differences (in 
percentage points) 
           
       




Vega and Winkelried (2005) 
a 
World: 23 IT, 
86 NIT 
Propensity 
Score  (-2.6 , -4.8)
IMF (2005) 
b 
EMEs: 13 IT, 
22 NIT 
Cross-section 
OLS  -4.8 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2007) 
21 world IT, 13 
ICs 
Cross-section 
OLS  1.2 
           
       
 
Notes: 
    a. Zero means statistically 
zero 
      b. Denotes an interval for inflation-level 
differences 
    ICs denotes inflation converging ITers 
    OLS=Ordinary Least Squares 
       
 
Table 7: Estimates of Differences in Long-Term Inflation Rates between Different 
Groups of IT and Non-IT Countries, Panel-Data Results 
Long-term Inflation-level Differences (in percentage points) 
                        
Treatment Group / 
Control Group  Method  NIters and pre-
ITers  Non-ITers  pre-ITers 
              
          All ITers  OLS  -1.9  zero -5.0 
a 
All ITers  IV  -4.8  zero  -5.0 
Industrial ITers  IV  zero  -1.1  zero 
Emerging ITers  IV  -7.5  zero  -6.4 
Stationary ITers  IV  -2.1  zero  zero 
Converging ITers  IV  -8.0  zero  -8.2 28 
 
              
         
 
Notes: 
      a. Zero means statistically zero 
      OLS=Ordinary Least Squares 
      IV=Instrumental Variable Estimator 
       
Source:
 
 Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). 29 
 
Table 8: Determinants of Inflation in the World, Panel-data Results 
Table 3
Determinants of Inflation
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: Fixed Effects with Instrumental Variables
Sample. 1975-2005 (annual data)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.160 *** -0.033 0.196 * 0.141 0.139
Normalized and Instrumented value (1.97) (0.22) (1.87) (1.42) (1.39)
Hyper Inflation 0.348 *** 0.488 *** 0.357 *** 0.363 *** 0.364 ***
(9.29) (6.54) (8.24) (8.83) (8.82)
High Inflation 0.232 *** 0.308 *** 0.226 *** 0.230 *** 0.232 ***
(14.02) (8.29) (11.14) (11.85) (11.72)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.051 *** -0.045 *** -0.051 † *** -0.054 † *** -0.055 † ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.41) (4.25) (3.80) (4.16) (4.27)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.029 *** -0.037 *** -0.031 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (7.70) (5.97) (6.77) (7.70) (7.82)
Openness
Trade Openness -0.009 -0.012 ** -0.019 -0.010
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.81) (2.15) (1.43) (0.73)
Capital Openness -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.94) (4.90) (4.79) (5.09) (5.06)
Relevant External Inflation 0.210 *** 0.412 *** 0.169 ** 0.080 0.127
Normalized  (3.11) (4.77) (2.10) (0.96) (1.57)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.204 *** -0.179 *** -0.251 *** -0.459 † *** -0.427 † ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.30) (4.46) (5.17) (5.15) (5.00)
Income per capita  -0.040 *** 0.012 *** -0.045 *** -0.051 † *** -0.047 † ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (3.67) (3.09) (3.46) (4.06) (4.20)
Domestic Private Credit 0.018 * -0.059 *** 0.028 ** 0.025 ** 0.024 **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.87) (4.65) (2.37) (2.26) (2.29)
Democratic accountability -0.002 -0.003 * -0.002 -0.002
(1.22) (1.65) (1.05) (0.74)
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
Cyclical component of oil prices 0.019 ** 0.017 0.013 0.026 ** 0.021 **
(2.01) (1.48) (1.14) (2.34) (2.05)
National Output Gap 0.238 *** 0.057 1.182 † *** 0.724 † ** 0.709 † **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented )  (3.60) (0.55) (3.06) (2.07) (2.02)
Foreign output gap (weighted by GDP) -0.204 -0.406 -0.565 ** -0.366
(0.93) (1.40) (2.11) (1.45)
Constant 0.467 *** 0.086 *** 0.504 *** 0.557 ** 0.512 ***
(4.80) (3.68) (4.47) (5.09) (5.22)
Hausman test (RE vs FE) p-value
Observations 1574 1574 1574 1570 1619
Number of Country number 65 65 65 65 65
R2 Overall 0.75 0.79 0.71 0.68 0.69
Note 1 : Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: The Hausman test favors FE regressions in all cases. Thus RE, being inconsistent, is no reported from equation 2
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Source: Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). 30 
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Source: Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) and Leyva (2008). 31 
 
Figure 2: Dates of IT Adoption and Annual Inflation before IT Adoption, Industrial 
















Note:  depicted points reflect annual inflation rates  during the 12 months that precede the month of IT 
adoption. 
Source: author’s calculation based on IMF data. 32 
 
Figure 3: Dates of IT Adoption and Annual Inflation before IT Adoption, Emerging 






























Note: depicted points reflect annual inflation rates during the 12 months that precede the month of IT 
adoption. 
Source: author’s calculation based on IMF data. 33 
 
Figure 4: Annual Absolute Inflation Deviations from Targets in Industrial Economies, 
















































Figure 5: Annual Absolute Inflation Deviations from Targets in Latin American 















































Figure 6: Annual Absolute Inflation Deviations from Targets in Asian Economies, 














































Figure 7: Annual Absolute Inflation Deviations from Targets in Central-Eastern 















































Figure 8: Inflation Deviations from Targets measured by Root Mean Squared Errors 
 in Industrial and EME Inflation Targeters, 1990-2008 

































Note: Left panel:  industrial-country ITers; right panel: emerging-market economy ITers. Source: author’s calculation based on central bank data.38 
 
Figure 9: Inflation Deviations from Targets measure by Root Mean Squared Errors 
 in Stationary and Converging Inflation Targeters, 1990-2008 

































Note: Left panel:  stationary ITers; right panel: converging ITers.  Source: author’s calculation based on central bank data. 
 
Figure 10: Rolling Estimation of Root Mean Squared Errors in Groups of IT 
































Industrial ITers Emerging ITers Stationary ITers Converging ITers
 
Note: Rolling series for inflation deviations from target for each country group correspond to the 
simple average of inflation deviations for each country member. 
Source: author’s calculation based on central bank data.  
 
Figure 11: Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Inflation and Output Volatility in IT 









































Figure 12: Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Inflation and Output Volatility in Non-





































Figure 13: Central Bank Transparency Index for Country Groups by Monetary 
Policy Regimes, 1998-2006 
 
Source: Geraats (2008), based on data by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). 
Note: the transparency index ranges from 0 (least transparent) to 15 (most transparent).  
 
Figure 14: Central Bank Transparency Index for Industrial and EME 










Source: Geraats (2008), based on data by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). 
Note:
 
 the transparency index ranges from 0 (least transparent) to 15 (most transparent). 